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Party competition in a multiparty system 
An empirical study of Dutch party competition 1982-2010 
 
 
Abstract 
Party competition lies at the heart of every democracy. It is related to party organization and 
electoral behavior. There is no consensus on what the political space of competition looks like. The 
left-right dimension is the most well-known model of party competition. However, especially in 
multiparty systems, with multiple salient issues each election, locating parties in a predefined one-
dimensional space is very unlikely to capture all differences between parties. This study addresses 
the question what the spatial representation of party competition in multiparty systems looks like. Is 
it indeed structured along a left-right dimension, or are multiple dimensions necessary to understand 
competition? It has been argued before that  competition in multiparty systems is best understood 
using multiple dimensions. However, this is the first study that investigates whether the left-right 
dimension gives accurate information about party competition both deterministically and 
probabilistically.  First, the formal logic behind the empirical use of the left-right dimension is tested. 
In other words, it is investigated whether the necessary conditions for one-dimensional competition 
hold in a multiparty system. Additionally, it is investigated how much information is gained when the 
space of competition is modeled probabilistically, without the a priori assumption that competition is 
one-dimensional. Focusing on party competition in the Netherlands, it is found that in all election 
years from 1982 to 2010 left-right party positions did not give an accurate representation of Dutch 
competition. Rather, two-dimensional spaces are necessary. Especially ethical issues and the issue of 
European integration cannot be squeezed into an overarching left-right dimension.  
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Introduction 
Party competition lies at the heart of every democracy. It underlies the behavior of various 
political actors, such as voters (e.g. Mair, 2008) and parties (e.g. de Swaan, 1973). Therefore, 
it is important to understand how party competition works. In studies on party competition, 
parties’ ideological standpoints are referred to as ‘positions’. That parties are said to have 
ideological positions implies a political space in which the parties can be located based on 
their position. In the literature, there is no agreement about what this political space of 
competition looks like. The debate has two components. First, there is no agreement on the 
number of dimensions necessary to understand party competition. This discussion is closely 
related to different views on party competition and party election. Budge and the Manifesto 
Research Group argue that party competition takes place on a single left-right dimension. 
They believe competition does not exist in direct confrontation on each issue, but in 
different saliency weights given to issues by parties (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 7). These 
differential emphases are reflected in parties’ positions on a left-right dimension, which is 
seen as a one-dimensional political spectrum in which various party positions can be 
compared across time and space (Budge et al, 2001). On the other hand, some scholars 
argue there may be more than one dimension on which parties compete. The confrontation 
approach (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006) assumes that parties compete with 
each other by taking oppositional positions on the same political issues, which can vary over 
countries and time. Rather than capturing competition on one dimension, the approach 
allows for the possibility that the political space is multi-dimensional.  
 Second, among those who believe the political space is multi-dimensional there is an 
ongoing debate about the content of the relevant political cleavages and dimensions (Lipset 
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and Rokkan, 1967; Franklin et al, 1992; Kitschelt, 1994; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001; Kriesi et al, 2008). It has been argued that the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
cleavages are not as relevant for political competition anymore as they once were. With the 
rise of new politics, post-materialist value issues became important (Inglehart and Flanagan, 
1987; Inglehart and Abramson, 1994). More recently, various scholars have argued that in 
addition to a (traditional) left-right economic dimension, cultural issues – immigration and 
European integration – structure party competition in Europe (Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001; Kriesi et al, 2008). 
 Although different models of competition exist, the most well-known space of 
competition is still the left-right scale, a one-dimensional political space. Political parties 
(and voters) in this space are referred to as having a ‘leftist’ or ‘rightist’ position. The 
position of actors in the middle is referred to as ‘center’ (Laver and Hunt, 1992: 11). 
  The left-right dimension was often used as a tool in comparative research. However, 
it has now been argued that the concepts of left and right mean different things in different 
countries and over time (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Van der Brug, 2001; Van der Brug 
and Van Spanje, 2009; Jahn, 2011). This means that party positions on the left-right 
dimension are not comparable over time and space anymore. The question so rises why the 
left-right dimension is still used to study competition in one country at one time point. 
Especially in multiparty systems, with multiple salient issues each election, locating parties in 
a predefined one-dimensional space is very unlikely to capture all differences between 
parties. 
 This study addresses the question what the spatial representation of party 
competition in multiparty systems looks like. Is it indeed structured along a left-right 
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dimension, or are multiple dimensions necessary to understand competition? It has been 
argued before that the left-right dimension is not a good model of competition. However, 
this is the first study that empirically investigates whether left-right party positions give 
accurate information about party competition by testing the formal logic behind the 
empirical use of the left-right dimension. It is investigated whether the necessary conditions for 
one-dimensional competition hold in a multiparty system. Additionally, it is investigated how 
much information is gained when the space of competition is modeled probabilistically, 
without  the a priori assumption that competition is one-dimensional. 
 Because the Netherlands has a multiparty system with parties therefore competing 
on multiple issues every election, it is an interesting case to study the claim that one-
dimensional left-right party positions provide complete information about party 
competition. Moreover, rich data on party positions on relevant political issue dimensions 
and on the left-right dimension are available for the Netherlands over time, which allows the 
me to investigate whether the importance of the left-right model has changed over time. 
Additionally, I have knowledge about Dutch politics and can so interpret the findings.  
 
The left-right dimension 
The concepts of left and right first appeared during the French Revolution in 1789. In the 
French Constituent Assembly, supporters of the king, the conservatives, were seated to the 
right of the Chair, and supporters of the revolution, the progressives, were seated to his left. 
This division between left and right as an indication of a difference in ideologies became the 
basis of many spatial theories of competition. In one of the earliest analyses of party space, 
Downs (1957) argues that party competition takes place on a single left-right dimension. 
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Downs argues that political ideologies on a single dimension are helpful for voters to make 
their vote choice. Voters do not have complete knowledge about the impact of each party’s 
policy on their personal situation, and therefore “many a voter finds party ideologies useful 
because they remove the necessity of his relating every issue to his own philosophy” 
(Downs, 1957: 98). Parties themselves, according to Downs, use ideologies to maximize their 
vote share and in their battle for office. The classical Downsian interpretation of the left-
right dimension is that it aggregates all political questions to “one crucial issue: how much 
government intervention in the economy should there be?”(Downs, 1957: 116). Parties’ 
positions on the dimension can range from left, full government control, to right, being in 
favor of a completely free market. 
 Where Downs saw the left-right dimension as reflecting an economic issue, the 
modern understanding of the scale is that it is a dimension that includes all political issues. 
The concepts of left and right are seen as together constituting some sort of ‘super-
issue’(Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Laver and Budge, 1992), aggregating party positions 
on various political issues. Having this overarching status in politics, many still believe that 
party competition is structured along the predefined left-right dimension and assume that 
the left-right dimension is applicable to all (democratic) countries. As such, the left-right 
dimension provided an answer to the need for a tool to compare party systems over 
countries. Castles and Mair for instance had as their ultimate goal to “create a scale (…) for 
cross-national comparative research” when conducting cross-national expert surveys on 
party positions in 1984 (Castles and Mair, 1997: 151). And one of the considerations for 
Budge et al to reduce the content of party manifestos to positions on a left-right dimension 
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was that “our political space should be generalizable and stable across countries and time” 
(Budge and Bara, 2001b: 59). 
 In addition to being a tool in comparative research, the left-right dimension is also 
used in country specific studies (e.g. Van der Brug, 1997; Bara and Budge, 2001; Van 
Holsteyn et al, 2003; Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 2008). In both cases, it is assumed that party 
competition can be understood by comparing party positions in the one-dimensional 
political space. However, among left-right scholars, there is some dispute about how the 
left-right dimension structures competition, and when this is so. Budge and the Manifesto 
Research Group (2001) most firmly argue that political competition takes place along a single 
dimension. The saliency and valence theory, on which their project is based, assumes that 
competition exists in “differential emphases given to issues by parties rather than direct 
confrontation on each issue” (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 7). Because competition does not take 
place on separate issue dimensions, to understand competition all parties should be placed 
on a left-right dimension which can be understood as a common space that is generalizable 
across countries and time. The left-right dimension is seen as a “common yardstick” to 
describe party positions (Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983: 229). The dimension is assumed 
to represent underlying political conflicts best, by summarizing emphases that parties 
ascribe to the political issues: “Left wing parties do not emphasize tax-cutting but stress the 
expansion of welfare, while Right wing parties do the opposite. (…) such varying priorities do 
quite clear differentiate overall party stands” (Budge, 2001: 76, emphasis in original). Budge 
and colleagues do not only see the left-right dimension as a helpful tool to study competition 
and compare party systems over countries and over time. They argue competition really 
takes place on this dimension for it is the one which party leaderships think within when 
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positioning themselves for the election (Budge, 1994). It is assumed both politicians and 
electors see the political world in left-right terms. 
 Sani and Sartori (1983) also state that the left-right dimension is a “ ‘summary’ 
indicator (…) that obtains a superior, all-inclusive status within the hierarchy of cleavages” 
(p. 329). They argue that left and right are not only useful because of comparability, but also 
in virtue of the fact that left-right positions correlate to positions on salient political issues, 
and thus is representative of these positions. However, the scholars explicitly state that this 
does not mean that everything can be explained in left-right terms. A distinction is made 
between the domain of identification and the space of competition. Electorates are 
distributed into multiple dimensions, rather than along a single dimension. However, that is 
not to say that parties compete along the same dimensions. Rather, “the space of 
competition may well be a single space, regardless of how many cleavage and/or 
identification dimensions exist” (p. 330). The competition that is perceived to be rewarding 
is competition over the floating voters. That competition, Sani and Sartori state, takes place 
on a left-right dimension.  
 In line with Sani and Sartori, Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) argue that although 
voters in Western European countries can be located in a two-dimensional space, party 
competition is largely unidimensional. They state that all relevant political issues are 
absorbed by the left-right dimension (p. 312; see also Van der Brug et al, 2005). Following 
the reasoning of Irwin and Van Holsteyn (2008) when discussing the importance of religion in 
the Netherlands, Van der Brug and Van Spanje seem to believe that all issues not included in 
the left-right dimension are of marginal importance for understanding competition. 
However, contrary to the scholars described above, Van der Brug does explicitly 
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acknowledge that the meaning of left and right is dependent on the political context (Van 
der Brug, 2001; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). Although the left-right dimension 
structures the content of party programs during times of electoral campaigns, what political 
issues are salient differs over countries and time. As Van der Brug puts it, “The left-right 
dimension structures the debate about current issues, but the issues are different in each 
country and in each election. These analyses thus show that the meaning of left and right is 
dependent upon the current social, political and historical context. (…) Why, after all, should 
left and right be the same - and become visible in differential manifesto emphases on the 
same kinds of topics- in Sri Lanka, Lithuania, and Sweden?” (2001: 130).  
 Van der Brug is not the only one to argue that the concepts of left and right have 
different meanings over time and space (see e.g. Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Huber and 
Inglehart, 1995; Jahn, 2011). That the substantive meaning of the left-right dimension is 
context specific, has considerable implications for its use. It means that the dimension 
should not be seen as a common scale that is generalizable across countries and time, as 
Budge et al argue. A similar position on the scale might mean different things in different 
political contexts, and would thus not indicate a similar ideological position. Therefore, the 
left-right dimension now has limited use as an informative tool in cross-national and cross-
time comparisons (Van der Brug, 2001). 
 The left-right model of competition has been contested. It has been argued more 
than once that more than one dimension might be necessary to understand party 
competition (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006), and more sophisticated models 
of competition have been made (Lijphart, 1982; Kitschelt, 1994; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001; Kriesi et al, 2008). Even knowing that these models exist, it can be 
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understood that the simple one-dimensional left-right scale was used as a model of 
competition, because it made the comparison of party systems possible. However, now that 
it has been acknowledged that its use as a comparative tool is limited, comparability is no 
reason for its use anymore. Therefore the question arises why some a priori use the left-
right dimension to study party competition within a country at one time point. Is that some 
sort of habit, a heritage from the time that the left-right dimension was used in many 
comparative studies, or is the left-right dimension really the best way to understand 
competition? This study addresses the question what political competition in multiparty 
systems looks like. Can party competition be fully understood using the deductive left-right 
model, or are multiple dimensions necessary for an accurate understanding?  
 
Left-right party competition in the Netherlands 
Whether vital information is lost when assuming competition takes place on a left-right 
dimension will be tested in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a proportional electoral 
system with multiple parties competing each election. Although in theory the accuracy of 
the left-right model of competition can be studied in almost each country since the model is 
believed to be applicable to almost all countries, this study focuses on the Dutch system for 
three reasons. First, to investigate whether positions on multiple political issues can be 
squeezed into a single dimension, information is required on parties’ positions on relevant 
political issues, and on the left-right dimension. Precisely such data are available for the 
Dutch party system, over time. This allows me to test whether, if not now, party competition 
was once structured along a left-right dimension and how the dimensionality of the political 
space has changed over time. Second, with its multiparty system and multiple relevant 
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issues each election, the Netherlands fits perfectly the goal of this study for information can 
be obtained on what specific issues can, and cannot be collapsed into a single left-right 
dimension. Third,  I have knowledge about Dutch politics. This makes the Netherlands the 
best country to study since investigating the dimensionality of party competition is 
“essentially a substantive task that must be based on local knowledge of politics in the 
country concerned” (Laver and Hunt, 1992: 55). 
 It has been argued more than once that the Dutch party system is structured along a 
single left-right dimension. In the 1960s the Netherlands had a typical frozen party system, 
with voters voting according to the pillar to which they belonged. Dutch party competition 
took place along two dimensions, a socio-economic left-right dimension, and a religious-
secular dimension (Van der Meer et al, 2012). From the 1960s onwards, the Dutch party 
system gradually became unfrozen, and especially when three Christian parties merged into 
the CDA in the late 1970s and de-emphasized their Christian background, many argue the 
religious cleavage lost much of its importance. Rather, Dutch party competition became 
structured along a single left-right dimension (Sani and Sartori, 1983; Van der Eijk and 
Niemöller, 1987; Van der Brug, 1997, 2001). The left-right dimension became a “common 
yardstick” in the description of political parties (Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983: 229). The 
religious parties were compelled to compete along the left-right dimension, and as far as 
they focused attention to their religious heritage and so also competed along the religious 
dimension, this was only not to alienate their identifiers (Sani and Sartori, 1983: 335).  
Some scholars however argued that even after the de-pillarization of Dutch politics, 
religious issues were still at the core of politics. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1989) proposed the 
so-called ‘heartlands and battlefield’ model. In this two-dimensional political space three 
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groups of parties, the liberals, the socialists, and the confessional parties, were believed 
each to have their own heartland in which they could count on the loyalty of their voters. 
The parties competed with each other and other parties in the space across the borders of 
their heartlands, the battlefield. More recently however, Irwin and Van Holsteyn signaled 
that the group of voters in the religious heartland is eroding and that all heartlands have 
turned into “mini-battlefields”. They conclude that their model is no longer relevant, and 
that one of the future options is that Dutch competition is structured along a single left-right 
dimension (Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 2008).          
 
Non-separability 
One could argue there is a good reason for locating parties in an a priori assumed left-right 
space. Using the left-right dimension to indicate party positions in the Netherlands might be 
helpful because it has been argued that Dutch voters use the left-right dimension as a cue to 
assess party positions and to decide what party to vote for (see e.g Van der Eijk and 
Niemöller, 1987). As Sartori puts it, “When the citizen speaks, he may have many things to 
say. But when he is coerced into casting a (…) vote, he may well have to settle for the ‘least-
distance’ solution, that is, to vote for the party (candidate) perceived as closest, on the left-
right spectrum, to his self-assigned location on the same spectrum.” (1976: 338). It is 
therefore not argued here that the left-right dimension is never helpful. However, the extent 
to which this is the case depends on the goal of the study conducted. This study does not 
focus on voting behavior. That voters use the left-right dimension as a short cut to make a 
vote choice gives information, if any, about the dimensionality of the demand side (i.e. 
voters), while this study sets out to investigate the dimensionality of the supply side (i.e. the 
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parties). There is no reason to believe that the political space of voters is always explained by 
the same dimensions as the space of parties . 
 At the core, the only reason to use the a priori assumed left-right dimension for 
studying party competition should be that it provides the same information as knowing party 
positions on relevant issue dimensions. This is only the case when “one can infer parties’ 
positions on the ideological dimension from their position on the specific policies” (Gabel 
and Huber, 2000: 95). While scholars use the left-right dimension empirically, the underlying 
formal logic for its use is the ‘non-separability’ of positions on relevant issues. This means 
that a party’s position on one issue is dependent on its position on another issue; positions 
are thus known only conditionally (Hinich and Munger, 1997: 52). When explaining the 
concept of non-separability, Hinich and Munger (1997) argue that parties’ positions on two 
issues can be either negatively, or positively related. 1 These two types of non-separability 
are presented in figure 1. The ellipse curves indicate the areas in which parties are located.  
Panel (a) depicts a situation of ‘negative complementarity’; the more rightist a party’s 
position on project (issue) 1, the more leftist its position on project 2 is. Panel (b) 
schematically presents ‘positive complementarity’; a more rightist position on project 1 is 
associated with a more rightist position on project 2. Suppose project 1 indicates the issue of 
European integration, ranging from more to less integration, and project 2 designates the 
issue of income differences, ranging from small to large differences. In figure 1(a), the more 
Eurosceptic a party is, the smaller it thinks income differences should be. In the case of a 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that Hinich and Munger use the concept of non-separability to explain voting behavior and 
therefore consistently refer to voters. However, the idea of non-separability can be applied in an exact similar 
way to party positions on policy issues. 
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positive relationship, the more Eurosceptic a party is, the larger income differences should 
be according to the party.  
 
 
 
As can be seen in the figure, in a case of non-separable positions there is a perfect 
linear correlation between party positions on the relevant issues. Only then can one single 
left-right dimension accurately describe the overall party positions (Benoit and Laver, 2006: 
112). One can deduce a party’s position on all non-separable issues, from knowing its 
position on only one issue. For instance, in the case of negative complementarity we know 
that if party A is more Eurosceptic than party B, it will also favor smaller income differences 
than party B. We would thus only need one dimension to understand the parties’ positions 
on multiple issues. Every other dimension would be otiose for it will not provide us with any 
new information. For the left-right dimension to give us full information about absolute and 
relative party positions, the condition of non-separability should hold for all relevant issues. 
If party positions on the relevant issues are separable, a single left-right space will not 
give us enough information to fully understand competition. That situation is schematically 
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presented in figure 2. As can be seen, party B is much more Europhile than party A, and is in 
favor of smaller income differences. However, party C is also more Europhile than party A, 
but wants larger income differences. Overall, there is neither negative, nor positive 
complementarity of the issues. Party positions on the issues of EU integration and income 
differences are thus separable and we cannot deduce a party’s policy positions from one 
single dimension. Rather, we need both dimensions to understand how parties ideologically 
relate to each other. 
If the condition of non-separability is not satisfied, the a priori assumption that party 
competition is structured along a left-right dimension might destroy vital information on 
party positions (Laver and Hunt, 1992). By squeezing all relevant issue dimensions into one 
overarching left-right scale, parties that have very different positions on the separate issue 
dimensions might seem ideologically close on the left-right dimension. When we only look at  
the left-right dimension in figure 2, party B and C are ideologically very close. However, 
when we look at the parties’ positions on EU integration and income differences in a two-
dimensional space, we must conclude that actually, these parties have very different issue 
positions. We must also conclude that being rightist on the left-right dimension does not 
16 
 
necessarily mean the party is rightist on all issue dimensions. The left-right dimension might 
thus be misrepresenting both relative party positions, that is, it might misrepresent 
proximities between parties, and absolute positions, that is, it might misrepresent a single 
party’s issue positions. 
The weakest necessary condition for non-separability to hold is that the ordering of 
parties on all relevant issue dimensions is identical. Here, it will be investigated whether left-
right party positions give us accurate information about Dutch party competition by testing 
this most basic criterion both deterministically and probabilistically. As to make findings in 
favor of the left-right dimension most likely, absolute party locations and distances between 
parties will be left out of consideration. For eight Dutch elections only the ordering of party 
positions on all relevant issue dimensions at the time will be compared. When at a single 
time point the orderings of parties on the issue dimensions are similar, and similar to the 
ordering of parties on the left-right dimension, no vital information on Dutch party 
competition is lost by assuming one-dimensional left-right competition. The orderings of 
parties on the issue dimensions must thus be transitive. Using a probabilistic method, this 
means that Kendall’s tau (τ) must be 1 in the case of positive complementarity, or -1 in the 
case of negative complementarity. Kendall’s tau is a measure of association for ordinal rank 
variables that ranges from 0 to 1 (or -1) (see Kendall, 1938). It is a non-parametric test that 
represents the probability that a pair of parties is in the same order on the dimensions, 
versus the probability that the parties are in a different order. Kendall’s tau thus indicates 
the extent to which the condition of non-separability is violated.  
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Data  
Investigating whether the condition of non-separability holds in Dutch party competition 
requires information on parties’ positions on all relevant issue dimensions and the left-right 
dimension each election. The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) provide all 
information needed. The DPES have been conducted among representative samples of the 
enfranchised Dutch population in every parliamentary election year since 1971. Since 1981, 
the surveys contain items on voter perceptions of party positions on the left-right 
dimension, and on relevant issue dimensions. For the eight election periods since 1982, this 
study will test whether the left-right dimension is the most accurate model of Dutch party 
competition.2 
 Depending on the election year, respondents have been asked to locate the four, 
five, or six most relevant political parties on all dimensions. To assess these parties’ positions 
on the dimensions, the average party location ascribed by all respondents will be used. Using 
the perceptions of all voters avoids as much as possible the bias that potentially arises when 
voters only locate the party they voted for and so should generate a reliable measure 
(Dalton 2008: 909). 
 What issues constitute the left-right dimension during each election is dependent on 
what issues are salient in the campaigns (Van der Brug, 2001: 130). Therefore, investigating 
whether left-right party positions provide complete information on political competition 
requires knowledge on what the relevant political issues at the time are. The DPES provide 
the information by including in each wave items on party positions on those political issues 
that are relevant at the time. As to what the relevant issues to be included in the analyses 
                                                             
2 The election of 1981 is excluded from the analyses, for the next election was only one year later. 
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are at each point in time, I will thus be led by the data. The number of issue dimensions in 
the surveys, including left-right, ranges from 4 in 1982, to 8 in 2010 (see Appendix A for an 
overview of all dimensions). 
  
Orderings of Dutch parties 
This study investigates what party competition in multiparty systems looks like. First, it is 
tested whether competition can be fully understood on a single left-right dimension by 
examining whether the condition of non-separability of relevant political issues holds in the 
Netherlands over time. To make non-separability most likely, the orderings of parties on the 
issue dimensions will be compared to the ordering of parties on the left-right dimension, 
leaving distances and absolute positions out of consideration. Table 1 to 8 show the 
orderings of parties on the issue dimensions and the associated correlation coefficients for 
each election year. It should be noted that a higher number of issues and parties in the more 
recent surveys increases the likelihood of finding a violation of non-separability. This artifact 
of the data therefore also leads to lower values of Kendall’s tau when more parties are 
considered. However, as can be seen from the tables, even with a limited number of issues 
and parties the condition of non-separability is violated. In none of the election years does 
the left-right ordering of parties provide accurate information about Dutch party 
competition. 
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Table 1-8(a). Orderings of parties on relevant dimensions. Shaded areas indicate differences 
in the ordering of parties on the dimension when compared to the left-right ordering.  
 
Table 1-8(b). Appurtenant Kendall’s Tau correlation coefficients between issues. 
 
1(a): 1982 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Abortion PvdA D66 VVD CDA 
 
1(b): 1982 
 LR Nuclear Plants Income Differences Abortion 
LR  1,00 1,00 ,667 
Nuclear Plants 1,00  1,00 ,667 
Income Differences 1,00 1,00  ,667 
Abortion ,667 ,667 ,667  
 
 
2(a): 1986  
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Euthanasia PvdA D66 VVD CDA 
 
2(b): 1986 
 LR Nuclear Plants Income Differences Euthanasia 
LR  1,00 1,00 ,667 
Nuclear Plants 1,00  1,00 ,667 
Income Differences 1,00 1,00  ,667 
Euthanasia ,667 ,667 ,667  
 
 
3(a): 1989  
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Abortion PvdA D66 VVD CDA 
 
Euthanasia D66 PvdA VVD CDA 
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3(b): 1989 
 LR Nuclear Plants Income Abortion Euthanasia 
LR  1,00 1,00 ,667 ,333 
Nuclear Plants 1,00  1,00 ,667 ,333 
Income Differences 1,00 1,00  ,667 ,333 
Abortion ,667 ,667 ,667  ,667 
Euthanasia ,333 ,333 ,333 ,667  
 
 
4(a): 1994 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Crime PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
Ethnic Minorities PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
 
EU Integration CDA VVD D66 PvdA 
 
Euthanasia D66 PvdA VVD CDA 
 
4(b): 1994 
 LR Nuclear  Income Crime Ethnic  EU Euthanasia 
LR  1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 -,667 ,333 
Nuclear Plants 1,00  1,00 1,00 1,00 -,667 ,333 
Income Differences 1,00 1,00  1,00 1,00 -,667 ,333 
Crime 1,00 1,00 1,00   -,667 ,333 
Ethnic Minorities 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  -,667 ,333 
EU -,667 -,667 -,667 -,667 -,667  -,667 
Euthanasia ,333 ,333 ,333 ,333 ,333 -,667  
 
 
5(a): 1998 
Left-right GL PvdA D66 CDA VVD GPV 
 
Nuclear Plants GL PvdA D66 GPV CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD 
 
Social Benefits GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD 
 
Ethnic Minorities GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD 
 
EU Integration PvdA D66 CDA VVD GL GPV 
 
Asylum Seekers GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD 
 
Euthanasia D66 GL VVD PvdA CDA GPV 
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5(b): 1998 
 LR Nuclear  Income  Social  Ethnic  EU Asylum  Euthana 
LR  ,733 ,867 ,867 ,867 ,414 ,867 ,467 
Nuclear Plants ,733  ,867 ,867 ,867 ,138 ,867 ,200 
Income DIfferences ,867 ,867  1,00 1,00 ,276 1,00 ,333 
Social Benefits ,867 ,867 1,00  1,00 ,276 1,00 ,333 
Ethnic Minorities ,867 ,867 1,00 1,00  ,276 1,00 ,333 
EU ,414 ,138 ,276 ,276 ,276  ,276 ,138 
Asylum Seekers ,867 ,867 1,00 1,00 1,00 ,276  ,333 
Euthanasia ,467 ,200 ,333 ,333 ,333 ,138 ,333  
 
 
6(a): 2002-2003 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF 
 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA LPF VVD 
 
Income Differences PvdA D66 CDA LPF VVD 
 
Crime PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF 
 
Ethnic Minorities PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF 
 
EU Integration PvdA CDA D66 VVD LPF 
 
Asylum Seekers PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF 
 
Euthanasia LPF D66 VVD PvdA CDA 
 
6(b): 2002-2003 
 LR Nuclear  Income  Crime Ethnic  EU Asylum  Euthana 
LR  ,800 ,800 1,00 1,00 ,738 1,00 -,400 
Nuclear Plants ,800  1,00 ,800 ,800 ,527 ,800 -,200 
Income DIfferences ,800 1,00  ,800 ,800 ,527 ,800 -,200 
Crime 1,00 ,800 ,800  1,00 ,738 1,00 -,400 
Ethnic Minorities 1,00 ,800 ,800 1,00  ,738 1,00 -,400 
EU ,738 ,527 ,527 ,738 ,738  ,738 -,738 
Asylum Seekers 1,00 ,800 ,800 1,00 1,00 ,738  -,400 
Euthanasia -,400 -,200 -,200 -,400 -,400 -,738 -,400  
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7(a): 2006 
Left-right SP PvdA CU CDA VVD 
 
 Nuclear Plants SP PvdA CU CDA VVD 
 
Income Differences SP PvdA CU CDA VVD 
 
Crime SP CU PvdA CDA VVD 
 
Foreigners SP PvdA CU CDA VVD 
 
EU Integration CDA VVD PvdA CU SP 
 
Asylum Seekers SP PvdA CU CDA VVD 
 
Euthanasia PvdA VVD SP CDA CU 
 
7(b): 2006 
 LR Nuclear  Income  Crime Foreigne EU Asylum  Euthana 
LR  1,00 1,00 ,800 1,00 -,600 1,00 ,000 
Nuclear Plants 1,00  1,00 ,800 1,00 -,600 1,00 ,000 
Income DIfferences 1,00 1,00  ,800 1,00 -,600 1,00 ,000 
Crime ,800 ,800 ,800  ,800 -,800 ,800 -,200 
Foreigners 1,00 1,00 1,00 ,800  -,600 1,00 ,000 
EU -,600 -,600 -,600 -,800 -,600  -,600 ,000 
Asylum Seekers 1,00 1,00 1,00 ,800 1,00 -,600  ,000 
Euthanasia ,000 ,000 ,000 -,200 ,000 ,000 ,000  
 
 
8(a): 2010 
Left-right SP PvdA D66 CDA VVD PVV 
 
Nuclear Plants SP PvdA D66 CDA PVV VVD 
 
Income Differences SP PvdA D66 CDA PVV VVD 
 
Crime SP PvdA D66 CDA VVD PVV 
 
Foreigners PvdA  SP D66 CDA VVD PVV 
 
EU Integration CDA PvdA D66 VVD SP PVV 
 
Asylum Seekers PvdA SP CDA D66 VVD PVV 
 
Euthanasia PVV VVD D66 PvdA  SP CDA 
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8(b): 2010 
 LR Nuclear  Income Crime Foreigne EU Asylum  Euthana 
LR  ,867 ,867 1,00 ,867 ,200 ,733 -,600 
Nuclear Plants ,867  1,00 ,867 ,733 ,067 ,600 -,467 
Income DIfferences ,867 1,00  ,867 ,733 ,067 ,600 -,467 
Crime 1,00 ,867 ,867  ,867 ,200 ,733 -,600 
Foreigners ,867 ,733 ,733 ,867  ,333 ,867 -,467 
EU ,200 ,067 ,067 ,200 ,333  ,467 -,600 
Asylum Seekers ,733 ,600 ,600 ,733 ,867 ,467  -,600 
Euthanasia -,600 -,467 -,467 -,600 -,467 -,600 -,600  
 
 
  
The ordering of parties on the left-right dimension is stable over the years. The Socialists (SP) 
and Social Democrats (PvdA) are located at the most left end of the spectrum, followed by 
the Social Liberals (D66), Christian Democrats (CDA), and Liberals (VVD). The Conservatives 
(GPV) and Populist Right parties (LPF and PVV) are located at the far right end of the 
dimension. This ordering, however, is inconsistent with the orderings of parties on some of 
the issue dimensions. In each year, party locations on ethical issues are deviant from their 
positions on the left-right dimension. The rank order correlation coefficient τ between the 
ethical and the left-right dimensions is never 1. Although in the 1980s the association 
between the dimensions was still fairly strong (τ .667), in 2006 the dimensions were not 
related at all (τ .000). The Downsian left-right dimension is basically designed for a political 
system without Christian parties (Koch, 1979). Especially in the Netherlands, contrary to for 
example the United States, there is no unambiguous  relationship between religion and 
economics (Pellikaan et al, 2003; Pellikaan, 2010). A more rightist position on economic 
issues does not necessarily imply a more conservative ethical position. The lack of a link 
between these issues is most clearly mirrored in the relative positions of the Liberal VVD and 
the Christian Democratic party CDA. While the VVD is consistently considered to be the most 
rightist party when it comes to economic affairs, the party has liberal, ‘leftist’, stands when 
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ethical issues are concerned (and over time is increasingly perceived to have). 
Unsurprisingly, the CDA (and the more conservative GPV) has the most rightist position on 
ethical issues. That means that, although many have argued the religious dimension lost 
much of its significance since the 1970s, ethical issues cannot be compressed into the left-
right dimension without losing relevant information on party competition. 
 Since 1994 the issue of European integration seems also to disturb the dimensionality 
of party competition in the Netherlands. The ordering of parties on that dimension is 
different from the ordering on the left-right dimension. The Kendall’s tau correlation 
between party orderings on the European integration and the left-right dimension is also 
never 1. It ranges from .667 (a negative but relatively strong association) to a low score of 
.067 (almost no association) in 2010. That the issue of European integration cannot be 
squeezed into the left-right dimension is in line with what Van der Brug and Van Spanje 
(2009) found when studying Western European politics (see also Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001; Kriesi, 2008; Bornschier, 2010). Kriesi et al (2008) argue that in Western 
European politics, the issues of European integration and immigration of foreigners together 
form one cultural dimension. However, this dimension is very unlikely to exist in the 
Netherlands for the ordering of parties on these issues has never been similar. Relatively 
recently, the immigration issue does influence party competition. Although the issue has 
been salient for voters since the early 1990s (Aarts and Thomassen, 2008), it was not 
politicized at the party level. Only from the 2002 elections the ordering of parties on the 
immigration dimensions is different from the ordering of parties on economic dimensions (τ 
.800). Since the entrance of Pim Fortuyn and his LPF into national politics immigration 
became a new line of conflict in Dutch party competition (Pellikaan et al, 2003).  
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In each of the election years under study, at least one noteworthy violation of the 
condition of non-separability is found. Some parties have a rightist position on some issues, 
and a leftist on others, a possibility that was already acknowledged by Downs himself (1957: 
116). In the Netherlands, especially the issues of religion, economics, and immigration are 
separable. Different party positions mean that party competition in the Netherlands cannot 
be accurately understood in a one-dimensional left-right space, because one-dimensionality 
“is only guaranteed by assuming that all parties are always leftish (or rightish) on all issue 
dimensions” (Pellikaan, 2010: 476). When the left-right space is imposed to Dutch politics 
from above, some vital information on competition is lost. Therefore, party competition in 
the Netherlands is most likely best understood in a multi-dimensional space.   
 
Probabilistic method 
Scholars using the left-right dimension for studies on party competition presuppose that 
competition can be understood along a single dimension. The orderings of parties on the 
issue dimensions showed that the condition of non-separability of political issues is violated 
in every Dutch election in the past three decades. That means that party competition in the 
Netherlands was not structured solely along a left-right dimension, and that most likely 
multiple dimensions are necessary to understand competition. The question now remains 
what the dimensionality of the spaces of competition looks like, and what information is lost 
by imposing the left-right dimension to the Dutch party system. 
  In order to investigate competition in the Netherlands, configurations of the Dutch 
political spaces for parties will be produced for all election years since 1982, using a 
probabilistic approach. PROXSCAL Multidimensional Scaling Techniques (MDS) will be used 
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to obtain representations of the political spaces. As Kriesi et al have stated, when using MDS 
“we do not have to make any a priori assumption about the structure of the political space 
(...) we want to test our hypotheses regarding both the dimensionality of the political space 
and the nature of these dimensions” (Kriesi et al, 2006: 935). MDS is a mathematical 
mapping technique that that produces a low-dimensional configuration in which the 
distances between the cases on the spatial plot match as good as possible the 
(dis)similarities between the cases in the original data (Laver and Hunt, 1992). The plots will 
be based on party positions on all relevant political issues about which data are available in 
the DPES, in order to give a comprehensive overview of the overall Euclidean distances 
between parties.3 4 It is debatable whether party positions on the left-right dimension 
should also be included in the analyses to produce the spaces of competition. It could be 
argued that, since the left-right dimension is actually a conceptual construct, excluding left-
right positions would give a more ‘factual’ overview of the space of party competition, which 
would then only be based on issue dimensions. To the extent than including positions on the 
left-right dimension influences the spaces of competition found, these will resemble more 
the left-right space of competition. Again, to make the case for left-right competition as 
likely as possible, left-right party positions are included in the MDS analyses. However, 
including the left-right party positions in the MDS analyses does not influence the 
configurations of parties much, irrespective of the number of additional issues and parties 
(see Appendix B for two examples). 
                                                             
3 See table 1-8 for an overview of the issues and parties included in the analyses. 
4 Unfortunately, for each election year, data on different parties are available, which makes the spaces 
incomparable in terms of relative party positions over time. However, for each year the parties about which 
information is available are the most important during the elections. The overall plots should thus give a good 
indication of along how many, and which dimensions competition takes place each election.   
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 The produced spaces are purely mathematical, and can, without any additional 
information, not be interpreted substantively. Issue dimensions, like immigration, European 
integration, and economic dimensions, will be plotted in the figure to be able to interpret 
the Euclidean space in terms of ideological differences between parties. To investigate what 
issue dimensions help best to interpret what the political spaces look like, all relevant policy 
issues will be regressed over the coordinates of the MDS solutions for each political space 
separately. The explanatory power of these issues will indicate how many, and which issue 
dimensions help best to interpret the configuration of party positions.  
 
Results 
Table 1 to 8 show that in all of the Dutch election years in the past three decades, 
positioning parties in a one-dimensional left-right space induces a loss of vital information 
about Dutch party competition. Rather, we need multi-dimensional models to accurately 
understand which parties are ideologically close and which are not. 
 The idea that the Dutch party system is structured along multiple dimensions has 
been put forward before. It has been assumed that in addition to a socio-economic left-right 
dimensions, an orthodox dimension (Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001) or a non-material 
GAL-TAN dimension (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008) were salient in Dutch politics. It is 
now increasingly argued that some sort of cultural dimension (containing issues on 
immigration and/or European integration) structures Dutch party competition (Bornschier, 
2010; Kriesi et al, 2006; Pellikaan et al, 2003; Van der Meer et al, 2012). Based on explorative 
analyses of voters’ sympathy scores for parties, Aarts and Thomassen (2008) conclude that 
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over time three dimensions underlie Dutch competition, a traditional left-right, a religious, 
and an authoritarian-libertarian dimension.    
There is thus no consensus on what the dimensionality of party competition in the 
Netherlands looks like over time. Here, the dimensionality of Dutch party competition will be 
empirically investigated using the same probabilistic approach for each year. The produced 
spaces will thus be comparable in terms of the method used to produce them, rather than in 
terms of the number and content of relevant dimensions. Each year we want as few 
dimensions as possible to explain as much of the (dis)similarities between the parties as 
possible. To determine how many dimensions are necessary to understand Dutch 
competition, the scree plot that indicates the stress of the multidimensional scaling model is 
looked at. The ‘elbows’ in the scree plots show that for each year under study, a two-
dimensional model is optimal. One-dimensional solutions yield significantly worse fits. 
 Figure 3a to h present the spaces of Dutch party competition over time. The obtained 
spaces (without issue dimensions) are based on party positions on all issues available in that 
years’ data. In 1982 for example, the configuration of parties is based on the parties’ 
positions on the issues of abortion, nuclear plants, income differences and on the left-right 
dimension. The party space found only indicates the overall Euclidean distances between 
parties. It can thus be seen that overall, the PvdA and D66 are ideologically most proximate. 
The two-dimensional configurations of parties are compared to the parties’ exact positions 
on the issue dimensions. To interpret the distances between parties, dimension lines are 
plotted in the figures in such a way that the parties line up on the dimensions in the right 
order, representing also as good as possible the actual distances between the parties on 
29 
 
these dimensions (see Appendix A for the parties’ exact issue positions). 5 In 1982 the 
dimension lines show that the large distance between the PvdA and the VVD can be mainly 
explained by left-right and economic issues, while on abortion, the parties are relatively 
close (2.14 and 2.91 respectively). 
 As can be seen in the figures, the left-right dimension fits all the spaces of 
competition (see also Van der Brug, 1999, 2001). This is not surprising, since it has been 
proven that voters think about politics in left-right terms. The conclusion that left-right party 
locations provide incomplete information on competition is not dismissed by this finding. 
The fit only indicates a relation between party positions on a left-right dimension and 
positions in a mathematical political space. The study however focuses on the accuracy of 
information obtained by looking at left-right positions, and even though there is a relation, 
left-right positions still misrepresent absolute and relative party positions if taken alone.  
 
                                                             
5 The number of dimension-lines drawn in the pictures is dependent on the number of issue-questions in the 
data, but also on their fit to the data. The explained variance in a multiple regression analysis with the 
horizontal and vertical dimension coordinates as independent variables must be sufficiently high (R² must be 
around .90). For example, in 2010, the issue of euthanasia cannot be plotted, for the R² is only. 58. 
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Figure 3a-h 
Political spaces of Dutch party competition 1982-2010 
a 1982 
 
b 1986 
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c 1989 
 
d 1994 
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e 1998 
f 2002-2003 
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g 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
h 2010 
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 Tables 1 to 8 showed that he violation of non-separability sometimes seems petty. 
For instance, in the 1980s only two parties are located differently on the ethical and left-
right dimension. These dimensions are still relatively strongly associated (Kendall’s tau is 
.667). However, the figures demonstrate that even these violations should never be 
dismissed as being meaningless. As figure a, b and c show, although three or four issue-
dimensions are necessary to interpret the configuration precisely, one could say that in the 
1980s party competition was structured along an economic left-right dimension, including 
the issue of nuclear plants, and a second, ethical dimension. The left-right dimension 
explains the large distance between the socialist PvdA and the liberal VVD. When it comes to 
ethical issues on the other hand, all secular parties have approximately the same liberal 
position, deviating them from the confessional CDA. While the CDA is a center party in terms 
of left and right, in the 1980s, the multi-dimensional model adds to the left-right model by 
showing the relative distance between the CDA and the secular parties on the religious 
dimension. That way, party competition in the 1980s seems to reflect competition during 
the pillarization (see Lijphart, 1982). Only the traditional class dimension has been replaced 
by an economic left-right dimension, ranging from pro state (income differences should be 
smaller) to pro market policy positions. In 1994, no religious dimension could be plotted in 
the figure and party competition mainly took place on other issues. That year, the CDA lost 
20 seats. 
It has been argued that, although the issue of immigration was salient for voters since 
the 1990s (Aarts and Thomassen, 2008), immigration structures party competition only since 
the ‘Fortuyn Revolt’ in 2002 (Pellikaan et al, 2003). Criticizing the Purple coalition of VVD, 
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D66 and PvdA that had governed the Netherlands since 1994, and focusing on economic and 
multicultural issues, Pim Fortuyn and his LPF managed to seriously challenge the established 
parties. Participating for the first time, the LPF won 26 seats in 2002. However, as can be 
seen in the figures, already in 1994 immigration issues can help interpret the configuration 
of parties. Yet, it should be noted that in 1994 and 1998 the orderings of parties on the 
issues of ethnic minorities and asylum seekers was similar to the orderings of parties along 
the economic and left-right dimension; only relative distances between parties were 
different. Indeed, for the first time in 2002 the ordering of parties on the immigration 
dimensions were different than the ordering of parties on economic dimensions. From then 
on, immigration really influenced Dutch party competition. The issue of immigration also 
seems to have influenced the locations of parties on the left-right dimension, since the 
dimensions almost fall together. It is the first year in which left-right is closer to immigration 
issues than to economic issues. With the sudden death of Fortuyn in 2002 and eventually the 
disappearance of the LPF from the political scene, the saliency of the new issues did not 
vanish. The established parties seem to have adopted these issues and in 2010, when the 
PVV became the next big populist right party, and to a lesser extent in 2006, competition 
cannot be understood without taking immigration issues into account.      
 Kriesi et al (2008) have also argued that immigration influences Dutch party 
competition. However, they propose a two-dimensional theoretical model of party 
competition, consisting of an economic and a cultural dimension. The latter combines the 
issues of immigration and EU integration. However, in none of the years under study such 
cultural dimension is found; immigration and EU integration are spread out and form two 
separate, even relatively distinct, issue dimensions. This is not surprising. Since the Christian 
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Democratic parties are the driving force behind European integration, the CDA is the most 
Europhile party. At the same time the CDA has a more center position with regard to 
immigration of foreigners.  And, as can clearly be seen in figure 3h, the SP and the PVV are 
almost furthest apart when it comes to immigration issues, but have relatively proximate 
positions when European integration is concerned. 
 
Substantive differences  
All separate issue dimensions plotted in the figure individually add to our interpretation of 
the political spaces and so give extra information on Dutch party competition when 
compared to the left-right dimension. Comparing the configuration of parties  in the two-
dimensional spaces with their positions on the left-right dimension, some substantive 
differences appear. 
 While the CDA is a center party in terms of left and right, in the 1980s and in the 
beginning of the 1990s, the multi-dimensional models add to the left-right model by showing 
a considerable distance between the CDA and the secular parties. In the 1980s, this distance 
can be explained by the CDA’s conservative position towards ethical issues and in 1994 by 
the CDA’s positive view toward the EU.  
 In 1998, The CDA, the GPV and the VVD have close positions on the left-right 
dimension. However, the two-dimensional model shows relatively large distances between 
these parties that can be explained by religious and, to a lesser extent, economic issues. 
While the GPV is the most rightist party, on economic and cultural issues the VVD is most 
rightist. And the VVD has a liberal position towards ethical issues. In 2002, the two-
dimensional space shows a large distance between the CDA and the LPF which was not 
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apparent in the left-right model. This distance can be explained mainly by the LPF’s Euro-
skepticism, and its liberal position on religious issues. In the 2006 space of competition the 
religious dimension again plays an important role. While on the left-right dimension the CU 
has a center position, in the two-dimensional space a considerable deviation from all secular 
parties is revealed that can be explained by ethical concerns. 
  As table 8 already indicated, in 2010 the multi-dimensional model of competition 
adds most to the left-right model. Although the PVV is considered the most rightist party in 
general, on economic issues the VVD is most rightist. And while the CDA is a center party in 
terms of left and right, in the two-dimensional space the distance between the CDA and PVV 
is the largest. Comparing figure 3h to the exact positions of the parties on the dimensions 
shows that it is the EU integration dimension on which these parties are most deviant. The 
PVV has a Eurosceptic positions (5.92), while the CDA is considered most Europhile (2.92). 
EU integration can also explain the relative positions of the SP and PVV in the two-
dimensional space. While the parties are located at the opposite ends of the left-right 
spectrum, in the two-dimensional model the distance between these parties is not the 
largest. The EU integration dimension helps to interpret this proximity, for the SP has a 
similar stand towards European integration as the PVV. In 2010, the configuration of parties 
resembles a horseshoe, in which the extreme left and right are not so different. 
 
The left-right model versus a probabilistic approach 
By investigating what party competition in a multiparty system looks like both 
deterministically and probabilistically, it was found that important information on party 
competition was lost by imposing the left-right model to a party system from above. 
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Analyzing competition probabilistically showed that more than one dimension is necessary 
to capture all differences between parties. As described in the section above, in many cases 
the relative distances between parties were different than in the left-right space of 
competition. Also, the probabilistic multidimensional models add substantive explanatory 
information when the issue lines are plotted in de figures. 
 The results have thus shown that for each individual case using the probabilistic 
method when studying party competition has only advantages over imposing the left-right 
model from above. However, many studies on party competition have a comparative 
character, either in terms of time or countries. It was especially in comparative studies that 
the left-right dimension became such an important model of competition (see e.g. Castles 
and Mair, 1997). Because the same substantive left-right model is assumed to be applicable 
to all cases, exact party positions or absolute distances can be compared over cases. It can 
be said (irrespective of the substantive meaning of left and right) that the Labour party in the 
Netherlands is more leftist than the Labour party in Great Britain because it scores higher on 
the same scale. And one can say that the Labour party and the Liberal party are ideologically 
more different in the Netherlands, for the distance between the parties on the exact same 
scale is larger. Because the probabilistic model is very context-specific, absolute party 
positions in those models cannot be compared. It should thus be acknowledged that the 
main power of the left-right dimension, comparability of party positions, is lost when using 
the probabilistic approach for studying party competition. 
 Then is the probabilistic approach only useful when studying one case of 
competition? No. The spaces of competition found using the probabilistic approach may not 
be comparable in terms of the number and content of relevant dimensions, but they are 
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comparable in terms of the method used to produce them. In each case a configuration of 
parties is found, given that certain issues and parties are important in that context. So 
although absolute distances between parties cannot be compared, relative distances (which 
parties are closest or most deviant) still can, given that party competition actually does take 
place under different circumstances. And what should not be underestimated is the 
explanatory power of the probabilistic spaces. Rather than in the left-right model, in which 
differences and similarities between parties on different issues are brought back to some 
sort of average distance, the probabilistic spaces can show on what issues exactly parties 
have either proximate or deviant positions. In comparative studies, that information might 
be even more valuable than a comparison of absolute distances.  
 For instance, comparing the probabilistic models might be very helpful in studies 
on the rise of new party families. Not only can it be seen to what existing party(s) the new 
party is most proximate, but, contrary to the left-right model, the probabilistic models will 
also give insight in what political issues are important for the new party’s rise. Is there a 
political issue that is important in all countries faced with the rise of the new party and not 
in others? Can we indicate one or more issues on which the new party is deviant from all 
other parties? And can we see in which other cases such a new party is likely to emerge, 
given the configuration of established parties, and in which not? These are all questions that 
cannot be answered when only left-right party positions are known. So although there are 
some losses when the left-right model of competition is replaced by different case-specific 
probabilistic models, informatively, also much is won. Even for comparative studies. 
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Conclusion 
Some scholars still assume a priori that party competition can be understood in simple left-
right terms. However, especially in multiparty systems with multiple salient issues on which 
parties differ, one dimension is very unlikely to capture all differences between parties. In 
this study it was investigated what party competition in a multiparty system looks like. 
Although now various scholars have made multi-dimensional models of party competition, 
this is the first study that empirically investigates whether the left-right dimension gives 
accurate information about party competition in multiparty systems by testing the formal 
logic behind the theoretical and empirical use of the left-right dimension. It was examined 
whether the condition of non-separability holds in the Netherlands by testing its weakest 
necessary criterion; a similar ordering of parties on all relevant issue dimensions. It was 
found that in the past three decades, the left-right dimension never gave a complete picture 
of Dutch party competition. Rather, multiple dimensions seemed necessary. 
 A probabilistic investigation of the dimensionality of Dutch party competition over 
time, without any a priori assumptions about the dimensionality of the space of competition, 
revealed that in each year under study two, rather than one, dimensions are necessary to 
understand competition. The analyses indicated that when the deductive left-right model is 
applied to party competition the information gained might be deceitful. Parties’ relative 
positions on various issues are misrepresented by their left-right position. Especially ethical 
issues and the issue of European integration cannot be squeezed into an overarching left-
right dimension. 
 The findings in this study differ most from the finding of a one-dimensional left-right 
model of competition. This difference can in some cases be explained by the fact that 
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assumptions about competition are not tested empirically. Based on theories of how 
competition for voters works, some scholars just assume that party competition takes place 
in a predefined one-dimensional space (e.g. Sani and Sartori, 1983; Budge et al, 2001). Some 
differences can be explained by the empirical method used to study competition. The finding 
that in more recent years competition in European democracies can be understood to take 
place on a single dimension (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009) differs most notably from 
the conclusions of this study. That finding is however based on a Principal Component 
Analysis assuming orthogonal relations between dimensions. In that analysis, all dimensions, 
except for the EU integration dimension, load on one factor. It is not tested what the space 
looks like without the presupposition of orthogonally related dimensions. Most importantly, 
the finding that even the PCA analysis points at a second, European integration dimension is 
played down. Nowhere do the authors refer to a second dimension while it was already 
argued that especially because of the issue of European integration, the political spaces in 
European countries are best understood as being multi-dimensional (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). 
It is not my attempt to argue that a multi-dimensional model should always be used 
when studying party competition in multiparty systems. What model and method are used 
depend on the goal of your study. Since it has been argued that voters use the left-right 
dimension as a short-cut to make their vote choice (see e.g Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 
1987), left-right models of party competition might be very helpful for studies that focus on 
voting behavior. And if one knows which issues are important, or only wants to compare 
party positions on a limited number of self-selected issues, there is also no need to employ 
the probabilistic approach used in this study. Rather, one can use a multi-dimensional model 
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with each dimension reflecting one issue and then position the parties in this presupposed 
space (see e.g. Pellikaan et al, 2003). 
 The goal of this study was to investigate what party competition in a multiparty 
system looks like. All together the my empirical findings showed that vital information on 
party competition is lost when the theoretical left-right dimension is imposed to a party 
system from above. Rather, over time two-dimensional models are necessary to understand 
competition. Although these conclusions are only valid for the Dutch case, the Netherlands is 
very unlikely to stand on its own. Especially in countries with more than 2 political parties, 
and multiple relevant issues each election, one dimension is unlikely to capture all 
differences between parties. However, because both the relevant issues and parties are 
likely to be different over countries, it is very unlikely a single model of party competition 
exists that can be applied to all countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
References 
 
Bara, J. and Budge, I. (2001) ‘Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?’, Parliamentary Affairs 54 
(3): 590-606. 
 
Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006) Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge. 
 
Bornschier, S. (2010)  ‘The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western 
Europe’, West European Politics 33 (3): 419-444. 
 
Budge, I. (1994) ‘A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy 
Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally’,  British Journal of Political Science 24: 443-467. 
 
Budge, I. (2001) ‘Theory and Measurement of Party Policy Positions’,  in I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann, 
A. Volkens, J. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum (eds) Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, 
Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 75-91. 
 
Budge, I. and Bara, J. (2001a) ‘Introduction: Content Analysis and Political Texts’, in I. Budge, H. D. 
Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum (eds) Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for 
Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 1-18. 
 
Budge, I. and Bara, J. (2001b) ‘Manifesto-based Research: A Critical Review’, in I. Budge, H. D. 
Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum (eds) Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for 
Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 51-74. 
  
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., and Tanenbaum, E. (2001) (eds) Mapping Policy 
Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Castles, F. G. and Mair, P. (1997) ‘Left-right political scales’, European Journal of Political Research 31 
(1/2): 147-157. 
 
Dalton, R. J. (2008) ‘The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems. Party System Polarization, Its 
Measurement, and Its Consequences’, Comparative Political Studies  41: 899-920. 
De Swaan, A. (1973) Coalition theories and cabinet formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
Franklin, M., Mackie, T. and Valen, H. (1992)  Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and 
Attitudinal Structures in  Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gabel, M. J. and Huber, J. D. (2000) ‘Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right 
Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data’, American Journal of Political 
Science 44 (1): 94-103. 
 
Hinich, M.J and Munger, M.C (1997) Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hix, S. and Lord, C. (1997) Political Parties in the European Union.  London: Macmillan. 
 
44 
 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
 
Huber, J. and Inglehart, R. (1995) ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 
Societies’, Party Politics 1 (1): 73-111. 
 
Inglehart, R. and Abramson, P. R. (1994) ‘Economic Security and Value Change’, The American 
Political Science Review 88 (2): 336-354. 
 
Inglehart, R. and Flanagan, S. C. (1987) ‘Value Change in Industrial Societies’, The American Political 
Science Review 81 (4): 1289-1319. 
 
Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H. D. (1976) ‘Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-
right Dimension among Western Mass Publics’ in I. Budge, I. Crewe, D. Farlie (eds) Party Identification 
and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition. London: John Wiley and Sons. Pp. 
243-275. 
 
Irwin, G. A. and Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (1989) ‘Towards a more open model of competition’, West 
European Politics 12 (1): 112–138. 
 
Irwin, G. A. and Van Holsteyn, J. J. M. (2008) ‘Scientific Progress, Educated Guesses or Speculation? 
On Some Old Predictions with Respect to Electoral Behaviour in the Netherlands’, Acta Politica 43 
(2/3): 180-202. 
 
Jahn, D. (2011) ‘Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics. Towards a Deductive 
Approach’, Party Politics 17 (6): 745-765. 
 
Kendall, M.G. (1938) ‘A New Measure of Rank Correlation’, Biometrika 30 (1/2): 81-89. 
 
Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kleinnijenhuis, J. and Pennings, P. (2001) ‘Measurement of party positions on the basis of party 
programmes, media coverage and voter perceptions’, in M. Laver (ed.) Estimating the Policy Positions 
of Political Actors. London: Routledge. Pp. 162–82. 
 
Koch, K. (1979) ‘De onheilspellende paradox van de verzorgingsstaat’, in J. Bank, M. Ros and B. Tromp 
(eds) Het eerste jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme . Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers. Pp. 72-
108.  
 
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., and Frey, T. (2006) 'Globalization and the 
transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared' European Journal of 
Political Research 45: 921-956. 
 
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., and Frey, T. (2008) West European 
Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan S. (1967) ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An 
introduction’ in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives. New York: Free Press. Pp. 1-64. 
 
45 
 
Laver, M. and Hunt, W. B. (1992) Policy and Party Competition. London: Routledge. 
 
Lijphart, A. (1982) ‘The Relative Salience of the Socio-Economic and Religious Issue Dimensions: 
Coalition Formations in Ten Western Democracies, 1919–1979’, European Journal of Political 
Research 10: 201–211. 
 
Mair, P. (2008) ‘Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective’, Acta 
Politica 43 (2/3): 235-253. 
 
Pellikaan, H., Van der Meer, T., and De Lange, S. (2003) ‘The Road from a Depoliticized to a 
Centrifugal Democracy’, Acta Politica 38 (1): 23-49. 
 
Pellikaan, H. (2010) ‘The Impact of Religion on the Space of Competition: The Dutch Case’, Politics 
and Religion 3 (3): 469-494. 
 
Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983) ‘Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies’ 
in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds) Western European Party Systems. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 307-
340. 
 
Sartori,G. (1976) Party and party systems:A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Van der Brug, W. (1997) Where’s the Party? Voters’ Perceptions of Party Positions. Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, Dissertation.  
 
Van der Brug, W. (1999) ‘Voters’ Perceptions and Party Dynamics’, Party Politics 5 (2): 147-169. 
 
Van der Brug, W. (2001) ‘Analysing party dynamics by taking partially overlapping snapshots’ in M. 
Laver (ed.) Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors. London and New York: Routledge. Pp. 
115-132. 
  
Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2005) ‘Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others 
Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support’, Comparative Political Studies 38 (5): 
537-573. 
 
Van der Brug, W. and Van Spanje, J. (2009) ‘Immigration, Europe and the ‘New’ Cultural Dimension’, 
European Journal of Political Research 48 (3): 309-334. 
 
Van der Eijk, C. and Niemöller, B. (1983) Electoral Change in the Netherlands. Empirical Results and 
Methods of Measurement. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.  
 
Van der Eijk, C. and Niemöller, K. (1987) ‘Electoral Alignments in the Netherlands’, Electoral Studies 6 
(1): 17-30. 
 
Van Holsteyn, J. J. M., Irwin, G. A., Den Ridder, J. M. (2003) ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: The 
Perception of the List Pim Fortuyn and the Parliamentary Elections of May 2002’, Acta Politica 38 (1): 
69-87. 
 
Van Kersbergen, K and Krouwel, A. (2008) ‘A double-edged sword! The Dutch centre-right and the 
‘foreigners issue’ ‘, Journal of European Public Policy 15 (3): 398-414. 
46 
 
 
Van der Meer, T., Lubbe, R. M., Van Elsas, E. and Van der Brug, W. (2012) ‘ Adrift or adroit? A panel 
study in 58 waves on the sources of electoral volatility in the Netherlands, 2006-2010’, Acta Politica 
forthcoming.  
47 
 
 Appendix A 
Overview of exact party positions on all dimensions included in the analyses. The dimensions 
have been recoded so that all dimensions range from a ‘leftist’ to a ‘rightist’ position.  
The R squares indicate the explained variance in a multiple regression analysis with the 
horizontal and vertical Euclidean dimensions as the independent variables. The R² must be 
sufficiently high (around .90) for it to be possible to plot the dimension line in the multi-
dimensional  configuration of the Dutch party system (Figure 3a-h). If the R² is too low, as is 
the case for example with the issue of euthanasia in 2010 (.58) it is not possible to line up 
the parties PVV, VVD, D66, PvdA, SP and CDA, in that order in the two-dimensional space. 
 
1982 
1 Left           10 Right 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 2.98 4.84 7.58 7.79 
 
1 No nuclear plants        7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 2.45 3.31 4.79 5.00 
 
1 Pro leveling         7 Against leveling 
Income 
Differences 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 2.33 3.57 4.79 5.60 
 
1 Woman decides        7 Forbid abortion 
Abortion PvdA D66 VVD CDA R² = .99 2.14 2.73 2.91 5.25 
 
1986 
1 Left          10 Right 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 2.67 4.66 7.61 7.79 
 
1 No nuclear plants        7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 
1.68 2.92 4.61 5.23 
 
1 Smaller differences        7 Lager differences 
Income 
Differences 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 1.99 3.30 4.49 5.55 
 
1 Request patient        7 Forbid 
Euthanasia 
PvdA D66 VVD CDA 
R² = .99 
2.58 2.83 2.91 5.38 
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1989 
1 Left          10 Right 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = 1.00 3.11 4.21 7.03 7.37 
 
1 No nuclear plants        7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 2.71 3.04 4.50 4.86 
 
1 Smaller differences        7 Larger differences 
Income 
Differences 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 2.10 3.17 4.48 5.47 
 
1 Woman decides        7 Forbid 
Abortion PvdA D66 VVD CDA R² = .99 2.50 2.68 3.05 5.34 
 
1 Allow          7 Forbid 
Euthanasia D66 PvdA VVD CDA R² = .99 2.54 2.72 3.08 5.54 
 
1994 
1 Left          10 Right 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 3.72 4.94 6.45 7.25 
 
1 No nuclear plants        7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear Plants PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .95 2.96 3.17 4.51 5.02 
 
1 Smaller differences        7 Larger differences 
Income 
Differences 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 2.57 3.56 4.40 5.41 
 
1 Tough enough        7 Much tougher 
Crime PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .99 3.78 4.03 4.43 5.11 
 
1 Keep own culture        7 Adjust completely 
Ethnic 
Minorities 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD R² = .98 
3.20 3.83 3.91 5.09 
 
1 As fast as possible        7 Going too fast 
EU Integration CDA VVD D66 PvdA R² = .97 3.32 3.40 3.49 3.65 
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1 Allow          7 Forbid 
Euthanasia D66 PvdA VVD CDA R² = .89 2.72 3.00 3.05 5.13  
 
1998 
1 Left          10 Right 
Left-right GL PvdA D66 CDA VVD GPV R² = .99 2.84 4.25 5.07 6.23 7.18 7.35 
 
1 No nuclear plants        7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear 
Plants 
GL PvdA D66 GPV CDA VVD R² = .91 1.80 2.92 3.10 3.43 3.56 4.32 
 
1 Smaller differences        7 Larger differences 
Income 
Differences 
GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV  VVD R² = .99 2.29 2.51 3.48 3.74 3.77 5.26 
 
1 Much too low        7 Much too high 
Social 
Benefits 
GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD 
R² = .99 3.24 3.48 4.02 4.20 4.27 5.06 
 
1 Preserve cultural customs       7 Completely adjust 
Ethnic 
Minorities 
GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD R² = .97 2.98 3.39 3.86 4.08 4.81 5.33 
 
1 Unification should go further       7 Has gone too far 
EU 
Integration 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD GL GPV R² = .39 2.94 3.33 3.33 3.52 3.88 4.59 
 
1 Admit more         7 Send back 
Asylum 
Seekers 
GL PvdA D66 CDA GPV VVD R² = .98 
2.95 3.22 3.79 3.80 4.01 5.41  
 
1 Allow          7 Forbid 
Euthanasia D66 GL VVD PvdA CDA GPV R² = .91 2.76 2.90 2.97 3.04 5.38 6.54 
 
2002-2003 
0 Left           10 Right 
Left-right PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF R² = .99 3.43 4.44 6.30 7.03 7.56 
 
1 No nuclear plants       7 More nuclear plants 
Nuclear 
Plants 
PvdA D66 CDA LPF VVD R² = .97 2.89 3.09 4.09 4.78 5.02 
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1 Differences should be decreased    7 Differences should be increased 
Income 
Differences 
PvdA D66 CDA LPF VVD     R² = .86 2.68 3.59 3.81 4.72 5.31 
 
1 The government acts too tough    7 Government should act tougher 
Crime PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF R² = .93 4.26 4.33 5.06 5.36 6.28 
 
1 Preserve cultural customs       7 Completely adjust 
Ethnic 
Minorities 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF R² = .98 3.54 3.85 4.83 5.47 6.33 
 
1 Unification should go further       7 Has gone too far 
EU 
Integration 
PvdA CDA D66 VVD LPF R² = .82 3.10 3.41 3.43 3.43 5.08 
 
1 Admit more         7 Send back 
Asylum 
Seekers 
PvdA D66 CDA VVD LPF R² = .98 
3.31 3.74 4.23 5.21 6.58  
 
1 Allow          7 Forbid 
Euthanasia LPF D66 VVD PvdA CDA R² = .70 
2.75 2.83 2.97 3.06 5.56 
 
2006 
0 Left          10 Right 
Left-right SP PvdA CU CDA VVD R² = .99 2.63 3.59 5.77 6.75 7.19 
 
1 No more building        7 Quickly build more 
 Nuclear 
Plants 
SP PvdA CU CDA VVD R² = .99 2.54 3.14 3.52 4.32 4.89 
 
1 Smaller         7 Bigger 
Income 
Differences 
SP PvdA CU CDA VVD R² = .94 2.11 2.23 3.51 3.83 5.05 
 
1 Too strict         7 More strict 
Crime SP CU PvdA CDA VVD R² = .99 4.34 4.63 4.67 5.12 5.59 
 
1 Keep own culture        7 Adjust 
Foreigners SP PvdA CU CDA VVD R² = .93 3.75 3.93 4.51 4.69 5.60 
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1 Should go further        7 Has gone too far 
EU 
Integration 
CDA VVD PvdA CU SP R² = .76 3.14 3.37 3.90 4.23 4.73 
 
1 Admit more         7 Send back more 
Asylum 
Seekers 
SP PvdA CU CDA VVD R² = .98 
3.32 3.58 3.72 4.45 5.44  
 
1 Allowed         7 Forbidden 
Euthanasia PvdA VVD SP CDA CU R² = .99 2.58 2.74 2.84 4.50 6.48 
 
 
2010 
0 Left          10 Right 
Left-right SP PvdA D66 CDA VVD PVV R² = .99 2.48 3.22 4.58 5.90 7.34 7.77 
 
1 No more building        7 Quickly build more 
Nuclear 
Plants 
SP PvdA D66 CDA PVV VVD   R² = .99 3.05 3.49 3.78 4.42 4.57 4.91 
 
1 Smaller         7 Bigger 
Income 
Differences 
SP PvdA D66 CDA PVV VVD R² = .92 2.34 2.54 3.51 3.74 3.87 4.81 
 
1 Too strict         7 More strict 
Crime SP PvdA D66 CDA VVD PVV R² = .97 
4.21 4.41 4.54 4.72 5.37 6.39 
 
1 Keep own culture        7 Adjust 
Foreigners PvdA  SP D66 CDA VVD PVV R² = .97 3.65 3.75 4.09 4.15 5.10 6.65 
 
1 Should go further        7 Has gone too far 
EU 
Integration 
CDA PvdA D66 VVD SP PVV R² = .90 2.92 3.40 3.43 3.57 4.38 5.92 
 
1 Admit more         7 Send back more 
Asylum 
Seekers 
PvdA SP CDA D66 VVD PVV R² = .97 
3.46 3.47 3.92 3.93 4.88 6.54  
 
1 Allowed         7 Forbidden 
Euthanasia PVV VVD D66 PvdA  SP CDA R² = .58 2.62 2.73 2.79 2.82 3.07 4.71 
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Appendix B 
 
Multi-dimensional spaces with and without left-right party positions included  
 
Spaces based on three additional issues and four parties (minimum in data) 
 
1982 including left-right positions       1982 excluding left-right positions 
 
 
 
Spaces based on seven additional issues and six parties (maximum in data) 
 
1998 including left-right positions      1998 excluding left-right positions 
